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Hetch Hetchy Valley
before it was flooded
to provide a water
supply for San Francisco. (Courtesy of
the California State
Library)

Dam Fights and Water Policy
in California: 1969-1989
Harrison C. Dunning
WATER policy in California has been through many
transitions since the prior-appropriation doctrine was first
developed in the mid-nineteenth century. The rise of
irrigated agriculture, the growth of coastal cities with their
demands for water-storage projects, and the rapid increase
in water-related outdoor recreation since World War II
have all led to shifts in emphasis and, sometimes, to very
dramatic changes in legal doctrine within the state. In
many instances the evolution has been provoked by a
highly publicized controversy over the proposed construction or the operation of a dam or related facilities. These
dam fights have served to highlight the underlying clash in
values regarding the best use of water and to give focus and
life to what otherwise might have remained rather abstract
policy debates.
In this century California's most famous dam fight

undoubtedly was that over San Francisco's project in the
Hetch Hetchy Valley of Yosemite National Park. That
valley was regarded by many, foremost among them John
Muir, as one of the jewels of the Sierra Nevada, comparable in beauty to Yosemite Valley itself. Muir and the stillyoung Sierra Club fought hard to preserve Hetch Hetchy
Valley from the water project, but to no avail. Los Angeles
had built its Owens Valley project, other urban areas in
California would in the near future be enjoying water from
the Mokelumne River and the Colorado River, and San
Francisco's plans for the Tuolumne River could not be
defeated by Muir. There was an important dam fight. one
which had a major impact on national-park policy) But it
did not lead to any significant change in water policy in the
state.
Dam fights in California in the last 20 years. however.
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Rivers of Northern California. (Courtesy of the Johns Hopkins Univer
sity Press. Published for Resources for the Future)

have had very different outcomes. Some major water
development proposals have been defeated altogether and
are today no longer live possibilities. Even more important. perhaps, is the way some of the dam fights have led to
a distinctively more preservationist and environmentally
sensitive water policy. In that regard, none has been more

important than the dispute over Dos Rios.
Dos Rios: Development of a California
"Wild and Scenic" RiverSystem
Dos Rios was a large dam and reservoir proposed for the
Middle Fork of the upper Eel River on California's north
coast. It would have been a major source of water supply
for the State Water Project, with a storage capacity of over
seven million acre-feet of water. To understand its significance, one must understand something of the history of
state involvement in water development in California.
During the early decades of the twentieth century, the
major players in California water development were water
districts and cities. A multitude of districts developed the
rivers of the Sierra Nevada as sources of irrigation water
supply, while cities and special districts like the East Bay
Municipal Utility District (EBMUD) and the Metropolitan Water District of Southern California (MWD)
brought water hundreds of miles m their urban service
areas. Engineers for the state of California were on the
sidelines, but they were busy making plans to emulate the
districts and the cities by developing projects in the
Sacramento Valley to supply water to agricultural areas in
the San Joaquin Valley to the south.
These plans for a major state water project, however.

The Dos Rios site on the upper
Eel River. (Courtesy of the California Department of Water Resources)
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The Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta.
showing the route for the proposed
Peripheral Canal, defeated by the
California electorate in 1982. (Courtew of the California Department of Water Resources)
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met many frustrations. The fact that a state water project
would bring with it public power caused serious political
problems in the 1920s. Although these were overcome
during the Great Depression, by then state officials had
• concluded they would not be successful in selling the
bonds necessary to finance a state water project. As a
consequence, the state's Central Valley Project (CVP) was
turned over to the federal government in 1935. Ultimately
it was constructed by the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation,
which impounded water not only at Shasta Dam on the
upper Sacramento River, but also later at Trinity Dam on
the Trinity River on the north coast. That water is brought
by tunnel eastward to the Sacramento River, so as to join
the Shasta Darn water, most of which is exported to the San
Joaquin Valley.
After World War H, with the state economy recovered
and with many large landowners restive over restrictions
in federal reclamation law designed to ensure that federally developed water be limited to family farm enterprises,
state officials again developed plans for a water project.

The principal supply features of the state project, initially
widely known as the Feather River Project but now termed
the State Water Project (SWP), paralleled much of the
CVP: a major impoundment facility in the Sacramento
Valley, this one on the Feather River near Oroville; use of
river channels to convey released water to the SacramentoSan Joaquin Delta; pumps to lift water from the Delta into
an aqueduct heading south; and an off-stream storage
reservoir in the San Joaquin Valley, to be shared with the
CV?. California's legislature endorsed these initial features of the SWP in 1959, and with approval by the people
of the financing in 1960, construction of the project got
underway.
By 1964 the California Department of Water Resources
(DWR), which had been created in 1956 to design, build,
and operate the SWP, decided that the first additional
supply facility for the SWP should be on the north coast.
Just as the CVP had gone to the Trinity River, the SWP
would go to the Eel River, where there had been serious
flood problems which the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers

Dunning: Dam Fights and Water Policy in California: 1969-1989
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The south shore of Mono Lake. (Courtesy of Ray Borton)

The principal aqueducts which supply
Southern California. (Courtesy of the
Los Angeles Department of Water and
Power)
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wanted to remedy. After several years of studies, in 1967
the DWR entered into a memorandum of understanding
with the Army. The Corps would design, construct, and

operate the Dos Rios Dam and Reservoir, while the DWR
would contract for the project's water supply and would
construct conveyance facilities to the Sacramento River.
There the north coast water would join that from the
Feather River for supply of the various SWP contractors.
Opposition to Dos Rios came from several sources.
Regional tensions remained from the vote to approve the
financing for the SWP — the Burns-Porter Act had received public affirmation by only a very narrow margin,
with all northern counties voting against except for Butte
County, where Oroville Dam was to be constructed.
Environmentalism had developed very strongly in the late
1960s: 1969, the year when Governor Ronald Reagan first
expressed reservations about Dos Rios, was the year
Congress, with hardly a dissenting vote, approved the
National Environmental Policy Act. Local opponents of
the dam mounted an effective campaign, publicizing their
concerns to a statewide audience. Spiraling cost estimates
were a major difficulty. And, apparently of greatest impor-

tance to the gubernatorial decision, 2 Indians whose lands
at the reservoir site would have been flooded were strongly
opposed.
Thus, astoundingly to many observers of California
politics, the energetic director of the DWR lost the debate
over Dos Rios to the conservationist Secretary for Resources. A conservative governor sided with the opponents of a dam which SWP supporters said was badly
needed to meet the water-supply commitments undertaken
contractually by the DWR. Opponents led by rancher
Richard Wilson had succeeded in Sacramento in the sort
of dam fight John Muir had lost in Washington. Alternative water projects which would protect the Indian lands
were studied, but in 1971 the whole idea of an upper Eel
River project was abandoned.
Dos Rios moreover, was more than elimination of a
particular site from active consideration for a water facility. It signaled a radical change in the fundamental water
policy of the state, from one of wholehearted commitment
to water project development to a policy which treats a
free-flowing natural condition as the best goal for many of
the state's important stretches of river. The defeat of Dos
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New Melones Dam on the Stanislaus River. (Courtesy
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Bureau of Reclamation)
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Melones Dam oh the Stanislaus River. which has been
inundated by New Melones
Reservoir. (Courtesy of the California State Library)

Rios led directly to the enactment in 1972 of a tough state
Wild and Scenic Rivers Act, which bars development of
many portions of riven, particularly on the North Coast.
More than a fifth of the state's runoff was thus put "out of
bounds" for state water development, a startling occurrence in a state knoivn previously for its aggressive pursuit
of water projects.
The significance of the change in water policy wrought
by the California Wild and Scenic Rivers Act is best
understood in the context of state constitutional norms
developed in the 1920s. The perennial tension in California water law between norms of riparianism, favoring the
claims of adjacent landowners to water regardless of prior
use, and prior appropriation, rewarding those beneficial
users who were "first in time," had led to a judicial
decision in 1909 that a paramount riparian was not limited
to "reasonable" use in a dispute with an appropriator. 3 In
1926, in the famous Henninghaus case, the Supreme
Court of California reaffirmed that ruling,' despite the
enactment in 1913 of the Water Commission Act which
attempted greatly to constrain riparian prerogatives. Reaction to Herminghaus was strong, and in 1928 the state
constitution was amended in order to overturn it. The
amendment stated a policy of maximizing welfare by
requiring that the "water resources of the state be put to
beneficial use to the fullest extent of which they are
capable," of preventing water waste, and of conservation
for reasonable and beneficial use. 3 "Conservation" then
meant to impound fresh water behind dam i so it would
not, in the phrase popular then and still unfortunately
occasionally heard today, "waste to the sea." The amendment thus was a dam builder's dream come true.

The contrast between the water policy of the 1928
constitutional amendment and that of the 1972 Wild and
Scenic Rivers Act could not be more stark. The former
eschewed "waste" of fresh water to the sea; the latter
declared, as the act's fundamental policy, that "certain
rivers which possess extraordinary scenic, recreational,
fishery or wildlife values . . . shall be preserved in their
free-flowing state . . . such use of these rivers is the
highest and most beneficial use and is a reasonable and
beneficial use of water within the meaning of . . . the
Constitution."' By 1972, it was the prayers of the preservationists which were answered. The fight over Dos Rios
Dam had precipitated a major change in the state's water
policy.
The Mono Basin: Emergence of the
"Public 'Dust Doctrine"
Many of California's dam fights have presented the
question whether or not to build a proposed water project.
Hetch Hetchy and Dos Rios are leading examples. Another, a so-far defeated project proposed first as a CVP-SWP
joint facility and later as a feature of the SWP, was the
Peripheral Canal, designed to convey water from the
Sacramento River along the eastern edge of the Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta to the pumps at the Delta's southern
edge. But some dam fights have posed the question
whether the operation of an existing water project should
be significantly modified. The Mono Basin controversy is
one of those, and like the Dos Rios fight it has brought a
substantial change in water policy. This has happened
even before the "dam fight" itself has been completed.
The Mono Basin was targeted for water supply purposes
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The lower American River, Folsom-South Canal and
the EBMUD service area. (Courtesy of the University of Colorado Natural Resources Law Center)

over 60 years ago by the Los Angeles Department of Water
and Power (DWP). Later, a series of dams and aqueducts
was built to form a northern extension of the DWP's
Owens Valley project. They impound and convey an
average of about 100,000 acre-feet of water a year from
several of the streams which empty into Mono Lake, a
highly salty water body which provides habitat for significant numbers of bird life. The project provides over 15
percent of the Los Angeles water supply, and it also
generates power for municipal use.
Research on the environmental consequences of the
DWP's Mono Basin project indicates continued diversions
will likely cause serious disruption of bird nesting sites,
destruction of the food chain of various species of birds
and significant air pollution related to the alkaline dust left
behind as the level of Mono Lake falls. 7 The National
Audubon Society and other environmental groups as a
consequence brought suit in 1979 to force a drastic curtailment in the export of water from the basin. The principal
legal theory advanced was that the "public trust doctrine,"
an ancient concept of public access rights heretofore
largely confined to disputes over various types of shorelands, requires that result. Subsequently, California Trout,
an organization devoted to the advancement of trout fishing, also sued on the basis of certain Fish and Game Code
provisions to obtain augmented flows of water in the
stream stretches below the DWP dams and above the lake.
Although in no case is the final outcome certain, it
appears the legal and political attacks on the DWP's Mono
Basin projects will ultimately succeed in forcing more
water to be released downstream by the DWP, both to meet
the long-dormant Fish and Game Code provisions suc-

cessfully invoked by California Trout and to meet the
public trust requirements raised by the National Audubon
Society. 8 Last year the California Court of Appeal concluded that the State Water Resources Control Board
(SWRCB) should attach fish-protective flow requirements
to the licenses held by DWP for operation of its Mono
Basin projects," and the California Supreme Court has
denied a hearing in the matter. In 1983 the latter court
unanimously approved Audubon's theory that the exercise
of appropriative water rights is subject to limitation in
order to protect public trust values, including that of
preservation of wildlife habitat. ' 8 Furthermore, in 1989
the trial court in the Audubon case issued a preliminary
injunction requiring that the level of Mono Lake be maintained at approximately its current level, which means for
the near future the DWP will likely have to curtail water
exports from the basin. Finally, in September 1989, legislation was enacted which provides up to $65,000,000 in
state funds to help to protect Mono Lake, in part by
assisting the DWP to find replacements for some of the
water and power foregone to raise the lake.
Thus, although the final chapters have not been written,
the current situation is promising for those who initiated
the Mono Basin dam fight. But as with Dos Rios, the
ensuing changes in state water policy may be even more
significant.
To understand the policy consequences of Mono Basin
developments, one must again recall the heavy emphasis
in earlier years on promoting water projects. The constitutional language on maximum use and the need to avoid
"waste to the sea" has been mentioned, as has the way the
Wild and Sceriic Rivers Act effectively abolished that

Dunning: Dam Fights and Water Du/icy in Calififfnia: 1969-1989

policy for certain river segments. But that act left intact the
earlier policy for the majority of the state's waters. One
significant legislative move toward instream flow protection for those waters was the amendment of the Water
Code to specify that fish and wildlife enhancement and
recreation are beneficial uses of water, but that change was
insufficient to persuade the courts to order the SWRCB to
consider applications to appropriate water where no water
project was contemplated." Furthermore, although recommendations for systematic instream flow protection
were made by a blue-ribbon commissioni 2 they were
rebuffed by the legislature. A complicated water-resources
initiative which included similar measures was soundly
defeated in November 1982.
Thus, as of 1982, for waters not covered by the Wild and
Scenic Rivers Act, the best instream flow protection
which could be anticipated was from conditions placed in
the water right permits of conventional appropriators.
Some such permit conditions existed, but generally only
for recent projects. Older projects such as that in the Mono
Basin seemed untouchable.
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All that has changed in the policy aftermqth of the Mono
Basin controversy. The public-trust doctrine now permits
challenges to all water projects which are operated in a
way that seriously impacts fish, wildlife, recreation, and
other public values related to navigable water. Even where
a measure of instream flow protection had been achieved
through permit conditions, as in the Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta, that protection may be strengthened and/or
broadened as a result of application of the public-trust
doctrine." And in many other cases where such permit
conditions are nonexistent or inadequate, integration of
public-trust doctrine limitations may be required. Even
federal facilities like Trinity Dam, a CVP dam which has
seriously damaged the fisheries of the Trinity River, are
not immune to challenge.
New Melones: Subjecting Federal Projects
to State Controls
Those who challenged construction plans for the Dos
Rios project in the late 1960s and the way the DWR
operates its Mono Basin project in the 1980s took on some
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Foundation work and cofferdam at the site for Auburn Damon

the American River. A controlled failure of the cofferdam occurred during flooding in
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of the most powerful water interests in California. Their
successes have done much to change water policy and
water politics within the state. But both the SWP and the
Mono Basin project are dwarfed in significance by the
CVP, the giant federal project which moves in excess of six
million acre-feet of water from one place to another in
California. CVP water, in fact, represents about a third of
all the water developed by the Bureau of Reclamation in
the West. 14
For decades after the federal takeover of the CVP in
1935, construction of various elements of the project went
forward with the wholehearted support of California state
officials. Section 8 of the Reclamation Act of 1902,
pursuant to which the CVP has been built and operated,
provided for the Bureau of Reclamation to acquire its
water rights in accordance with California water law, but
this seems to have been regarded as strictly a pro forma
exercise. The occasional judicial decisions on Section 8
seemed to indicate that at most state law would serve to
define private rights in waters for which the Bureau might
have to pay compensation. 15 Indeed, it was common
practice for CVP projects to build the dam first and get the
water rights later, when the dam was ready to be closed.
That practice, technically in compliance with the requirements of California water-rights law, reflected the comfortable assumption among both federal and state water
officials that whatever permits were necessary. for the
project would be forthcoming with conditions acceptable
to the Bureau of Reclamation. The New Melones Dam
fight changed all that, and it brought us some sharply
different expectations about state control of federal water
projects.
Although a dam at the New Melones site on the Stanislaus River, less than a mile below "old" Melones Dam
built by local water districts, had been mentioned in state
water studies as early as the 1920s, it was first authorized
as a federal Corps of Engineers project in 1944. At that
time, the project was to be relatively small, with reservoir
capacity of only 450,000 acre-feet. Its principal purpose
was to be flood control.
New Melones I, as the project authorized in World War
II may be called, became a victim of several sorts of
bureaucratic difficulties. Ever since 1936, federal floodcontrol projects had been subject to benefit-cost analysis,
with a mandate that they be constructed only if benefits
exceeded costs. This was difficult to show for New Melones, if flood control were to be the major project purpose,
yet to broaden the purposes to include water supply for
irrigation and other uses ran the risk that Congress might
conclude that the dam should be built by the Corps' archrival, the Bureau of Reclamation. The Bureau, in fact, was
actively proposing a New Melones Dam ,to supply irrigation water to a new CVP aqueduct proposed for the east
side of the San Joaquin Valley. To complicate matters even
further, normally supportive state water officials this time
were saying additional storage for irrigation water supply
was not needed in that part of the state, and local water
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districts preferred further local water development to any
Bureau project.
Thus New Melones I never got underway, and by 1954
the Corps of Engineers had put it on the back burner. Both
the Corps and the Bureau maintained their interest in the
site, however. The Corps continued to massage the benefit-cost numbers, and the Bureau to push for more and
more storage capacity to support ever-grander plans for
expanded surface water supplies for San Joaquin Valley
farms. By 1962, the interagency dispute was resolved by a
decision to have New Melones — or "New Melones II" —
built by the Corps but operated by the Bureau. By now, it
was to be a massive dam, some 625 feet in height, with a
2,400,000 acre-foot reservoir. The latter would inundate
Melones Dam, as well as the Stanislaus Canyon farther
upstream. Political opposition in the region largely vanished after serious flooding in the Stanislaus River basin at
the end of 1964. By 1965 initial construction funds for
New Melones Dam were approved by Congress, and by
1966 construction was underway. The first phase of the
dam fight, in which no environmental objections were
heard, was over.
The agency skirmishing prior to the approval and initial
funding of New Melones Dam was conventional and
largely outside the view of the general public in California. Not so the dam fight which erupted in the 1970s — an
unconventional, emotional, and highly publicized battle
which some regard as California's most important environmental controversy of the decade. The effort was
twofold: first, to try to stop construction of a partially built
project — an outcome, for example, which had occurred
for the Cross Florida Barge Canal, but which was certainly
a rare event. Second, once construction of the massive
dam had been completed, to delay or possibly prevent
forever filling of the reservoir beyond the point of inundation of the Stanislaus Canyon. The point of limiting the
reservoir to "moderate" storage, about one-third of what
Congress had authorized, would have been to preserve
recreational uses and environmental values in areas which
otherwise would be inundated by the reservoir.
Central to the concerns of opponents of New Melones
Dam was whitewater boating in the Stanislaus Canyon.
Although commercial whitewater trips did not begin on
the Stanislaus River until 1962, by the mid 1970s the river
was one of the most rafted in the United States. It offered
water of moderate difficulty, which provided recreation
for many thousands of people. A particular feature was its
use for groups of disabled persons. In effect a major
recreational asset had been developed upstream concomitantly with the planning and initial construction phases of
a major water project downstream, and the collision
between the two was dramatic. 16
Many tactics were tried by those who sought to protect
the Stanislaus Canyon from inundation. The Environmental Defense Fund was enlisted to bring a National Environment Policy Act (NEPA) lawsuit in 1972 over the adequacy
of the New Melones Environmental Impact Statement. An
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initiative was qualified. Proposition 17 on the November
1974 California ballot, which called for a halt to construction of the dam. State scenic river status was sought for the
Stanislaus Canyon. Civil disobedience took place. A bill
to provide national wild river status for the canyon was
introduced in Congress. A second initiative. Proposition
13 on the November 1982 California ballot, included
limits on filling the reservoir. Some of these efforts
produced delay, but none prevented the eventual filling of
New Melones Reservoir. Proponents of a protected Stanislaus Canyon lost the dam fight. but not without making
an important contribution to water policy in California.
The vehicle for the most lasting policy impact of the
New Melones Dam controversy was the SWRCB, formed
in 1967 by a merger of state water-rights and water-quality
entities. The SWRCB in the early 1970s began to show a
greatly increased interest in the recreational and environmental amenities of rivers and in the detrimental — often,
devastating, particularly regarding fish and wildlife —
impact on those amenities of water projects. One manifestation of that interest was SWRCB action in 1973, by
which time the New Melones Darn was already a political
hot potato. The board had before it the Bureau of Reclamation's application for water rights to store water behind the
partly built dam and to divert water for various uses
throughout the vast . CVP service area.
Ordinarily an application for water rights for stillanother CVP unit would have been processed in a routine
manner, with little fanfare. But New Melones was different. and the SWRCB was different from the former State
Water Rights Board. New Melones had widespread opposition, and the SWRCB was newly concerned with the
"instream" question — the value of water flowing in place
in a river, including water like that in the Stanislaus
Canyon, even though its recreational advantages were
greatly augmented by impoundments and releases at upstream power facilities. The SWRCB in 1971 had set state
water-quality objectives for the Sacramento-San Joaquin
Delta more stringent than the relevant federal waterquality standards, in a decision which purported to bind
the CVP. In 1972 the board demanded augmented flows in
the lower American River as a condition of the permits for
Auburn Dam, another CVP facility. And in 1973, on New
Melones, the SWRCB made filling of the reservoir for
irrigation water supply other than the satisfaction of prior
rights contingent upon later board approval of a specific
plan for use of the water.
The stage was thus set for a showdown on the legal
authority of a state to limit a federal water project. Section
8 of the Reclamation Act, which as noted above in the
1960s had been read as providing minimal state control of
reclamation projects, had been brought to center stage by
the New Melones Dam battle. Lawsuits were filed on the
Delta and American River permit conditions as well, but it
was that on the New Melones permit conditions that was to
come before the United States Supreme Court. And in
1978 the bitterly divided court revived Section 8 by

holding that California's permit conditions would stand.
unless particular ones could be shown to be contrary Co a
"clear Congressional directive." 7 On remand to the
lower court, the conditions would have to be examined one

by one.
Unfortunately, the doctrinal victory of 1978 by the

SWRCB was not enough to save the Stanislaus Canyon.
Ultimately the Ninth Circuit upheld all 25 of the board's
permit conditions, but severe flooding largely filled the
reservoir, and the SWRCB's plans to force release of the
impounded flood waters brought threats from the legislature to strip the board of its permit conditioning authority.
The board backed down, the permits were amended, and
the reservoir stayed full.
The policy consequence of greatest importance from
the fight over New Melones Dam is being felt not on the
Stanislaus River but on other important waterways in the
state. Federal recalcitrance at meeting state water-quality
standards for the Delta, for example, has greatly diminished. A Coordinated Operations. Agreement has been
signed by the DWR and the Bureau of Reclamation with
regard to the SWP and the CVP, and federal legislation has
directed the Bureau to meet state water-quality standards,
at least up to a certain point. And the Bureau has indicated
a possible willingness to comply with state law requirements for the American River, scene of still another series
of dam fights. In effect, although those who fought to
protect the whitewater of the Stanislaus Canyon lost what
was precious to them, they set in motion a process which
has made the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation much more a
partner in achieving California environmental objectives
than it ever was before.
The American River

Dos Rios brought California its Wild and Scenic Rivers
Act. Mono Basin — "Mono Lake" to most people —
brought the public trust doctrine to California's waterrights law. New Melones brought the Bureau of Reclamation at least partway into compliance with California
environmental standards for water projects. The last "dam
fight" for consideration here involves disputes over the
flows of the American River. These disputes are on-going.
and the principal policy outcome is difficult to discern.
Wild-and-Scenic-River considerations, the public trust
doctrine, and federal compliance with state standards are
all implicated.
The American River arises in the central Sierra Nevada,
flows through California's capital city, and joins the Sacramento River just north of the Sacramento-San Joaquin
Delta. Although it is home to some local water supply
projects, surprisingly until after World War lithe American River had no CVP project. That changed with the
construction of Folsom Dam in the 1950s and the FolsomSouth Canal a few years later.
Folsom Dam, with its downstream regulating dam, was
designed to be complemented by the much later Auburn
Darn, which was to have a storage capacity of two and a
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half million acre-feet. But after the Auburn Dam site was
cleared and the foundation begun, the work was stopped
for further review of seismicity problems. In the face of
mounting costs at a time of enormous federal budget
deficits, difficulties in working out the financing when
greater contributions are being sought from state and local
beneficiaries, and continued vehement opposition from
environmental groups, however, it is currently uncertain if
the dam will be built. Flooding in the lower American
River basin in 1986 increased the pressure for construction, but also produced suggestions for a "dry" dam that
would serve only flood-control purposes. Presumably that
outcome would be much like having had a version of New
Melones Dam designed to have a mostly empty reservoir
which would not interfere with upstream recreation.
Folsom-South Canal originally was to be the first leg of
the ill-fated east-side CVP aqueduct mentioned above.
Twenty-five miles had been completed when an injunction
on NEPA grounds brought construction to a halt. Some
contracts have been entered into by the Bureau of Reclamation for Folsom-South water deliveries, however, including one for up to 150,000 acre-feet annually With the
East Bay Municipal Utility District (EBMUD). That contract, like the canal itself, has been the object of litigation.
Thus the American River dam fight is both about whether
and how to construct water-project facilities and about
how to operate those which are or may be built. It is similar
to both phases of the New Melones fight, or to Dos Rios
and Mono Basin rolled into one.
The Dos Rios and New Melones water-project controversies are both over — one down for the preservationists,
one down for the water developers. The water-policy
outcomes of each can be studied and discussed. The Mono
Basin battle is not over, but its initial contribution to
California water rights law is specific, well known and
important. Much more difficulty; however, attends any
attempt to pin down the long-term water-policy significance of the American River wars. In effect we have both
half-built projects and half-completed policy developments, and the latter have emerged in the context of some
most peculiar litigation.
The Environmental Defense Fund (EDF) has been a
major opponent of both the Auburn Dam and the Bureau of
Reclamation-EBMUD contract. The EDF first challenged
the contract with two arguments, both rooted in California's constitutional requirement that all water rights be
limited to reasonable beneficial use. One argument was
that the EBMUD should reclaim — recycle — its water
supply from the Mokelumne River before seeking additional water from the American River. The second was that
• any new water should come from below Sacramento, i.e.,
from either the Sacramento River or the Delta, in order to
preserve flows in the American River below the FolsomSouth point of diversion.
The EDFs lawsuit survived an initial objection from the
EBMUD that the constitutional restrictions do not apply to
rights to water held by contract, but then the Supreme
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Court of California tossed both parts of the suit out on two
different theories. The waste-water reclamation argument, it was decided, could not be entertained by the
courts until the EDF had taken it to the SWRCB — a
theory of "primary" agency jurisdiction. And the pointof-diversion argument could not be considered because
the EBMUD's contract was with a federal entity. and
consequently it could not be subjected to norms derived
from state law.
Just when the EDF's EBMUD suit appeared finished.
however, along came the New Melones decision from the
U.S. Supreme Court — the one that breathed new life into
Section 8 of the Reclamation Act and opened the door to
state law norms binding federal projects absent a "clear"
Congressional directive to the contrary. The implication_
for the American River litigation was obvious: the U.S.
Supreme Court vacated the decision of the California
Supreme Court, and the EDF was able to resume its
American River lawsuit.
Timing is important in war, love-making, and certainly
in litigation. The EDF's timing, by skill or by luck. was
perfect in having the American River case eci to Washington just after the New Melones decision. On return to the
state courts, its timing again proved to be faultless in
waiting several years to pursue the case. Apparently the
delay occurred as the EDF lacked the resources to enter the
expensive and time-consumptive trial phase of the case.
but by the time matters got moving again with a heavy
resource commitment from an intervenor. the County of
Sacramento, the California Supreme Court had announced
its public-trust ruling in the National Audubon Society's
Mono Basin lawsuit. Suddenly, the complexion of the
American River case was greatly changed. No longer was
it a matter simply of applying the "reasonableness" mandate of the state constitution. Rather, that was to be done
while at the same time complying with the new mandate to
"integrate" conventional development norms of waterrights law with the protectionist norms of the public-trust
doctrine.
How to do all this with any kind of methodological
coherence is a massive problem. For the environmentalists, it is largely a matter of ensuring that the public-trust
values newly made applicable to the exercise of water
rights go beyond merely ensuring consideration of matters
such as fish and wildlife impacts. Environmentalists seek
different outcomes in resource-allocation decisions, outcomes substantively more favorable to the preservation of
the public values of water in place. For the water developers, it is conversely a matter of diluting the public-trust
doctrine, of finding ways to make the values of water
development continue to prevail over those of nondevelopment, to resist any suggestion of a "priority" for instream
uses.
The next step in litigation over the validity of the
EBMUD's contract for American River water was a reference by the trial court to the SWRCB. As is standard
practice in such instances, the board was asked to advise,

aedardilank.Atic.

Dunning: Dam Fights and Water Policy in California: 19694989

the court on the facts and the legal issues. The SWRCB in
effect advised the court that as the EBMUD's diversions
would have minimal adverse impacts on American River
public-trust resources, there was no basis for modifying
the diversions. The board emphasized the importance for
water quality of diversion for municipal use from the
American River rather than the Delta. and the futility of
trying to modify the EBMUD's planned diversions when
the Bureau of Reclamation was not involved in the lawsuit.
Once again, things looked grim for the opponents of the
EBMUD Folsom-South point of diversion. An agency
designed to use its specialized expertise to resolve water
questions had in effect said to the court there is no problem
to concern you on the lower American River. No need to
try to integrate water-rights norms and public-trust norms,
because there is no significant threat to the public-trust
resources.
Exceptions to the SWRCB's report as referee are now
before the trial court, and at the moment this is written.
only a "preliminary tentative decision" has been issued.
That decision, however, is one of great interest. for while it
agrees with the board that the Folsom-South point of
diversion should not be modified. it also concludes that
any EBMUD diversions should be subject to respect for a
rather stringent flow regime in the lower American River.
In other words, the court does not agree there is no
significant threat to public-trust resources, and it' interprets the public-trust doctrine as requiring feasible resource-based levels of protection to be implemented.
Even more interesting as a policy outcome of this
litigation than the public-trust conclusion, however, is
what is said about reasonableness. Recall that the constitutional reasonable beneficial use limitation originated as a
way to implement a policy of maximum water development. "Conservation" was to occur to put water behind
dams and to avoid the dreaded -waste to the sea." Over
time, however, that policy objective has been complemented by the contrary objective of letting water flow
unimpeded in its natural channel — witness the unchallenged policy foundation of the California Wild and
Scenic Rivers Act. Now a court seems to be saying some
unimpeded flow is not only necessary to meet public trust
requirements, but also is required to satisfy constitutional
imperatives. Perhaps the most important water policy
contribution of the American River litigation, therefore,
will be once and for all to sever "reasonable beneficial
use" from notions of water development. Just as the
meaning of "equal protection" in the federal constitution
changed, as social conditions changed, from sanctioning
"separate but equal" racially segregated public schools to
mandating integrated public education, so "conservation," "waste." and "reasonableness" are terms whose
meaning is changing with new perceptions of what is in
society's best interests.
Dam Fighting and Water Marketing
My objective thus far has been to explore the relation-
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ship between particular dam fights in California and
evolution, in the state's water policy: Dos Rios and the
initiation of a state wild and scenic rivers system: Mono
Basin and application of the public-trust doctrine to water
rights: New Melones and greater state control over Bureau
of Reclamation projects: the American River and, it
seems, a new understanding of the constitutional reasonable beneficial use mandate. A final important policy
development, however, has been stimulated by dam fighting in general. rather than any particular dam fight.
"Water marketing" is the name which in the 1980s has
become popular for this phenomenon. Although that term
is sometimes used for initial allocations by a wholesaler
such as the Bureau of Reclamation, the current policy
debate is over reallocation of established water rights by
market mechanisms (e.g.. water for money or water for
water).
Water marketing is not, in fact, brand new in California
or in Western water law in general. Most states with priorappropriation water rights have for a long time held that
changes may be made in the place of use, type of use, and
point of diversion of the water, provided that third-party
water-right holders, including juniors. are not injured by
the change. Water boards and courts have concerned
themselves with "change applications." and scholars have
examined what used to be known as the "transferability"
of water rights. Studies have shown considerable transfer
activity in places like the Sevier River area in Utah and the
Colorado-Big Thompson Project in northern Colorado. In
California, transfers have been common in the adjudicated
ground-water basins on the southern coastal plain. An
earlier example of surface water marketing was the acquit
sition by Los Angeles of water rights in the Owens Valley.
Despite these precedents for water marketing, in many
cases problems exist. Market transactions are facilitated
by precision in the definition of the right being sold —
precision which often is not provided where rights are
measured by actual past beneficial use rather than by a
decreed amount. "Beneficial use - in principle does not
include wasted water, yet whether waste has occurred is
generally not examined until a transaction is proposed.
Hydrological complexity may make the calculation of
impact on third-party right holders exceedingly difficult
— transaction costs can be greatly increased by an expensive "depletion analysis." Third parties who are not waterright holders — equipment suppliers in the agriculturallyoriented town where nearby farmers want to sell water
rights to a distant city, for example — may object, and the
fact that most water rights are administered by an agency
may mean a forum for their objections is readily available.
Entities created to acquire a water supply for their area
may display considerable institutional inertia when faced
with the suggestion they sell some of their water rights to
an entity somewhere else. For these and doubtless other
reasons, historically those who seek an augmented water
supply have looked much more frequently to new water
development than to a water marketplace.
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Dam fighting changes that. In the time since the Dos
Rios proposal in California. the noncontroversial largewater project has vanished from the scene. Environmentalists. fiscal conservatives, local activists, and others are
certain to organize against any proposed new major water
development and vociferously to put forward their objections. Water development is now as problematic as trying
to work out a deal to purchase water rights, and any water
acquired by development may be considerably more expensive than water obtained by the purchase . of water
rights. Hence in California, as elsewhere in the-West, there
is greatly increased interest in water marketing.
In at least a crude sense, this phenomenon in California
in the last 15 years is related to continued dismal prospects
for new water projects. Leaders of the water-development
community, for example, were convinced that the drought
of 1976-1977 would lead to construction of the Peripheral
Canal. Instead, legislation authorizing the canal and a
number of other water projects was placed by referendum
on the ballot and resoundingly defeated in 1982. Legislation in 1980 adopting water marketing as a policy objective for California went forward, however, with little
objection. Indeed, in 1982 it was supplemented by a
legislative directive to state agencies to work to facilitate
market transactions in water rights.
The most publicized water "marketing" transaction in
California in recent times involves the MWD and the
Imperial Irrigation District (IID). In the 1950s the MWD's
chairman had been interested in acquisition of some of the
massive amounts of water from the lower Colorado River
which service farming areas in the Imperial and Coachella
Valleys. That idea died, however, with the birth of the
SWP. But the defeat of the Peripheral Canal revived
interest in the concept. one which was strongly supported
by the Environmental Defense Fund. Defeat in the legislature of an alternative to the Peripheral Canal presumably
increased the MWD's interest in an Imperial deal even
more. Years of negotiation between the MWD and the IID
finally produced an agreement. Whether that agreement
technically constitutes "water marketing" is disputed, but
the essence is water from the 'ID in return for money from
the MWD. The latter will provide the financing for physical improvements in the IID system and will receive the
salvaged water for a term of 35 years.
The MWD-IID transaction now serves as an inspiration
for more large-scale reallocations of water in California.
The MWD is working with the Arvin-Edison Water District in the southern San Joaquin Valley on a possible
reallocation. Water marketing is slowly gaining credibility
as an important part of California's water scene, despite
continuing ambivalence or hostility from many in the
state's farming and environmental communities. There is
some tension between water marketing and the instreamprotection policy spawned by the Dos Rios, Mono Basin,
New Melones, and American River controversies, but
nonetheless it seems the growth in water marketing, like
the increase in instream flow-protection, has been pro-

y oked in large part by opposition to water development.
Conclusion
Dam backers and dam fi ghters typically display very
different preferences for the use of our limited Western
,water resources. Dam backers want to "put the water to
work - — to maximize beneficial uses such as irrigation,
municipal water supply, and power production. To them a
big dam is a thing of beauty, a manifestation of success in
the conquest and manipulation of a hostile environment.' 8
Dam fighters, on the other hand, mix an interest in
instream recreational amenities with a larger concern for
preservation of parts of our natural heritage as places for
repose. for spiritual satisfaction, and for observation of
nature at work in its own way. Dam fighters want some
rivers to run free, to sustain riparian vegetation and
wildlife, to nourish estuaries. For them it is anathema to
speak of water "wasting to the sea."
Neither of the two camps, of course, presents an absolutist position. Dam backers often love to go trout fishing
on a free-flowing stream, and most dam fighters surely
enjoy the benefits of a reliable municipal water supply, an
irrigated agricultural economy, and inexpensive hydropower production. But the differences are pronounced.
and they are important. Both groups may support "balance" in our water policy, but with radically different
notions of what an appropriate balance entails.
California's experience of the past 20 years suggests
that dam fights highlight the underlying clash in values
and often lead directly to significant changes in water
policy. On balance, the California dam fighters seem to
have gained strength in this period, even though they have
lost some major battles. They have given new prominence
to stream protection and water marketing. Wise management is replacing unrestrained development as California's dominant water. policy.
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NATIONAL AUDUBON SOCIETY, et aL.

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
COUNTY OF EL DORADO

In the matter of

)
)
)
)

MONO LAKE WATER RIGHTS CASES
)

Coordinated Proceeding
Nos. 2284 and 2288
fURODOSSO4 PRELIMINARY
INJUNCTION

)

This Document relates to

)
)

rational Audubon Society v.
Department of Water & Power,
Alpine County No. 566

)
)
)

The motion of plaintiffs in Alpine County No. 566,
National Audubon Society et al. (collectively, "Audubon")
and the State Lands Commission, for renewal of the
preliminary injunction in this case came on for evidentiary
hearing beginning June 21, 1990, and was submitted on
January 17, 1991. T. Bruce Dodge, Patrick J. Flinn, and
Bryan Wilson appeared on behalf of Audubon. Jan Stevens and
Michael Valentine, Deputy Attorneys General, appeared on
behalf

of

the State Lands commission. Adolph Moskovitz,

Janet Goldsmith, Thomas Birmingham, and Kenneth Downey
appeared on behalf of defendant Department of Water and
3.

. RC

opt

Power of the City of Los Angeles. Michael Gheleta, United
States Department of Justice, appeared on behalf to the
United States as AmicUs curiae and Paul Bruce appeared on

behalf of the Great Basin Unified Air Pollution-Conti-gal
, District as Amicus Curiae.
The Court, having considered the testimony and
evidence submitted in support of and in opposition of the
motion, finds and orders as follows:
1.

Audubon and the State Lands Commission have

proven that a threat of irreparable harm, combined with a
probability of success on the merits of this dispute,
.justifies . ..entry of this injunction. Accordingly; the
HDepartment otWater and lower of the City of Los Angeles
ArDWP n ),

tolether ,with_its_egents, employees, and others

acting• in concert with DWP, are ordered, subject to the
availability of water, to allow to pass through its
diversion facilities in or around Rush Creek, Lee Vining
Creek, Parker Creek, South Parker Creek, and Walker Creek,
sUfficientiater to bring the level of Mono Lake to 6377
feet above sea level (NGVD 1 29 datum) and to maintain the
lake at or above that elevation during the pendency of this
order as described in paragraph 5 Infra.
2.

The releases are subject to the following

conditions:
a. In no event shall DWP be required to
release water to Mono Lake in an amount which will cause
the level of Grant Lake Reservoir to fall below its
elevation on March 31, 1989.
2

b. The maximum flow rates provided by the
Preliminary Injunction filed December 6, 1989, 11 1(b)
and (c), for Rush creek and Lee Vining creek shall no
longer be in effect. Instead, in accordance with this
Court's second amended order regarding interim flows
(and subject to DWP's ability to control flows), the
maximum flow for Rush Creek shall be 165 cubic feet per
second ( mcfs n ); the maximum flow for Lee Vining Creek
shall be 160 as; the maximum flow for Walker Creek
shall be 15 oft, and the maximum flow for Parker Creek
shall be 23 cfs.
3.

In the event that the level of Mono Lake

exceeds 6377 feet above sea level (NOVD '29 Datum), DWP may
store, divert, export, or make such other lawful use of any
such water not reasonably projected to be needed to maintain
the lake at that 6377 toot elevation.
4.

Plaintiff's undertaking in the amount of

$1,000 shall be maintained during the pendency of this
injunction.
5.

This order shall continue in effect according

to the terms of, and pursuant to, the Stipulation and Order
Regarding Scope of Preliminary Injunction Ruling, filed
February 19, 1991.
Dated'

54tdi7, /If/
•
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Superior Court judge
272367(pjf1)
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;NTRODUCTImi

This is the second preliminary injunction sought by

18 petitioner' from this court to require respondents to restore and
19 maintain the level of Mono Lake at 6377 feet above sea level. The
- 20 first preliminary injunction issued in August 1989, had it been
21 met, would have resulted in the level of the lake being restored

in
1

22

to 6377 feet and maintained there through the 1989-1990 runoff

23

yeftr, ending March 30, 1990.

24 1

The parties have agreed that pending this decision the court's

previous injunctive order will remain in effect. They have further
nt.
4: !
H
2E _stipulated with sore qualifications, that this ruling of the ccurt

MM.

IHU

I

WIeb iJ.fltAJrcsaun ...n

shall remain in effect until the Water Resources Board has

2 completed the public trust hearing
3
4

for

which it

is now

preparing.

The court heard many days of testimony, mostly from expert
witnesses, read numerous briefs, reviewed several hundred exhibits
and re-read the closing arguments of counsel totalling some 448
pages of transcript. In addition, the court in the company of the
parties, has visited the Mono Lake Basin.

7
8
9

It should also be mentioned that during this same time frame,
the court donducted a hearing on the issue of the appropriate
interim stream flows mandated by the decision of the Appellate

10 Court in what has been commonly referred to as
CA2-201101.-II.
11 (California Trout. Inc. v. SuDe rtsr:Sarr t [1990] 218 cal.App. 3d
12 187).
13
Those interim stream flows affect Les Vining, Parker, Walker,
14 and Rush creeks. The court's interim stream flow order Contain;
15 details that need be of no concern here. Suffice it to say the net
16 result compels the respondents to release approximately 60,000 acre
17
18

feet of water yearly down those four creeks.
LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS

19

Cal. Civil Practice code 5526 provides, in part:

20

An injunction may be granted...

21

2. When it appears by the complaint or affidavits
that the commission or continuance of some act during the
litigation would produce waste, or great or irreparable
injury, to e party to the aCtionft.

22
29
24 11

25!!
261

3. When it appears during the litigation that a
party to the action is doing or threatens,
threatens or is about
to do, or is procuring or suffering to be
some act
in violation of the rights of another party to the actich
respectinv the subject of the action, end tending to
render the judgment ineffectual;

2

(Th
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4. When pecuniary compensation would not afford
adequate relief....
Some of the factors the court must : weigh in determining

3 whether a preliminary injunction should issue before trial on the
4 merits are the following:
5
6
7
8
9
10

nil
( 12
13
14
15
16
17
18
• 19
20
21
22
23,
(..\ 24i
(

25h

1. The general purpose of a preliminary injunction
is to preserve the status quo until final determination
on the merits; •
. 2... Whether the smrty seeking the injunction is
likely to prevail on the merits;
. .
3. The granting of a preliminary injunction is a
.drastic solution to a , pendente lite problem;
.- 4. . The court should exercise its discretion in

favor of party most likely to be 'injured by the exercise
,of -its discretion e (Continental Bakina Co. v. Katz,
(1960 68 Ca-1.2d 112 quoting from ramjAy Record Plan.

Itra-X.,StEllfial [1959) 172 Cal.App. 2d 235 at 242).
pTATUS OUQ
During the final argument the court asked counsel to state'
what they contended the status quo to be. Mr. Moskowitz, counsel
for respondent Department of Water & Power, stated
""We believe the status quo is that we are permitted
to continue to divert water as we had been doing when the
lawsuit was filed, and when the motions were made,
subject, however, also to whether that might cause
irreparable injury.
"THE COURT: I understand that. But I just -- so
your concept of what the status quo was when the court
was asked to intervene is to allow you to export water
as you had in the past, I take it, subject to the interim
stream flows now?
"24R. KOSKovITZ: Oh, yes. tee.
"THE COURT: A11 right. Thank you."
(RT, January 17, 1991, page 184, lines 11-21).
Mr. Dodge, counsel for petitioner Audubon responded
want to respond to that question and then wa'::
have three points. The answer to Your Honor's quest'or

'
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is that the status quo to be preserved is 6377 feet when
we applied for the preliminary injunction.

2

5

"I would also note that regardless of what status
quo was to be preserved, one can still seek a preliminary
injunction where the test for a preliminary injunction
is met, which is basically balancing of the equities and
the probability of success on the merits, which is
something that I'm going to address a little later.""
(PT, January 17 1 1991, page W I lines 2-11).

6

Mr. Jan Stevens, counsel for petitioner State Lands Commission

3
.4

7
8
9
10
11

12

had previously stated what he believed the status quo to be
"And the third issue, of course, was the maintenance
of the status quo. And in that respect we don't accept
the argument that continued diversions resulting in
continued harm to the Lake in effect constitutes the
status quo. The status quo, we believe, is to attempt
to preserve the status of the Lake in it's present
condition or better. And to attempt to preserve the
Public Trust values that exist in the Lake."
The respondents' position as to what the status quo is seems

13 to the court to be flawed. To claim the right to divert water as
14 had been done before the lawsuit was filed, absent irreparable harm
16 begs the question. Clearly the water diversions by respondent
18 before the lawsuit was filed caused irreparable harm. Counsel for
17 respondent argues that experimenting with the ecology and
18 environment of the Mono Basin does not cause irreparable harm
19 because it can always be repaired. Streams can be rebuilt, the
20 level of the lake can be lowered and then raised again, gull
21

populations can be decimated by predators Using land bridges to

22 what had been islands of protected habitat and then recover. Such
23

an argument is bottomed on the assumption that to constitute

241 irreparable harm the harm must be permanent. No authority for such

25 :: a position is cited and the court doubts any can be found.

One

25 sirply has to ask about the lost public trust use of Lee Vining,

4
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I

Parker, Walker and Rush creeks to put to rest the argument that to

2

be irreparable, a harm must be permanent.
For years both Parker and Walker creeks were partially or

3
4
5

completely dewatered. - The'fisheries in those creeks were
destroyed; the stream beds were, in places, obliterated and
riparian vegetation was lost. During the same' period Lee Vining
and Rush creeks were also adversely affected in a similar but less

7
severe fashion. .The loss for years of those excellent trout

8
9

streams denied the citizens who would have recreated- by fishing
those streams the-right that the public trust was intended to

10 protect. The loss of that recreational experience to thousands of
11 citizens over a substantial number of years is irreparable and even
12 though the streams are in the process of being restored, those lost
13 recreational opportunities are permanent.
14

In fairness, the court should note that counsel acknowledges

15 that respondent cannot in the future continue to divert the same
16 amount of water it has in the past and that there is a level below
17 which the lake should not be allowed to drop. However, the
10 argument then goes on to say that for various reasons respondent

19 should be allowed to continue diversions, allowing for the interim
.20 stream

flows ordered by the court, until the public trust hearings

21 have been completed by the Water Resources Board in December of
22 1992.
23

RESPONDENTS' POSITION

Avoiding the technical language of the experts the court
24
q t. understands respondents' position to be that a minimum lake level
or,

of 6277 feet as ordered by the court in 1589, is not necessary to
prttect the Mono Lake environment against irreparable tr7. that
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1 there would be no ecologically significant change if the
2 drops to approximately 6373.5 feet, the
3 be expected
4
5
6

level

level that could reasonably

on October 1, 1993 1 if the injunction is denied.

To be more specific, respondent argues that if the injunction
is denied and the lake level is allowed to fall as low as 6373.5

feet, there would be no material adverseeffects on the
limnology of the lake; that is, lake chemistry, the algae, the

7
8

shrimp, or the alkali flies.

There would be no adverse effects on the birds, the California
Gulls, the Grebes and the Phalaropes.

10

There would be no adverse effects on the air quality, the

11 aesthetics, recreation; and further changes in ownership between
12 the State and Federal Government would be immaterial and clearly
13 not serious or irreparable.
14

On the other hand counsel argues the adverse effects on

15 respondent& water supply if the 6377 foot lake level must be
18 restored and maintained would be substantial over the next two or
17 three years. It is 'claimed there would be a lose of 96,500 acre
18

feet of water resulting in an increased cost to respondent of more

19 than $34 million including the loss of revenue from hydroelectric
20 power and the cost of fossil fuels.
21

In summary, counsel argues the status quo should be maintained

22 unless serious or irreparable injury would result if the level cf
23

the lake were not maintained at 6377 feet, and that status quo has

24

been the diversion of water since 1541.

nri
etc!

piscumnst
A comment concerning respondents' position should be rue.
run. sel on more than one occasion admonished the court thet
6

fTh
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is a preliminary injunction proceeding and not a public trust

2 balancing process. However, counsel did not explain how the court
3 should go about weighing the petitioners' probability of success
4 on the merits,
5
8
7

SS it .just ,
. .. without taking public trust

considerations into account.
The court believes Mr. Stevens definition of status quo is
correct and bears repeating: "The status quo, we believe, is to
attempt to preserve the status of the lake in its present condition

9

or better. and to atteMpt to preserve the Public Trust values that
exist in the . lake." (RD, January 27, 1991, page 113 lines 23-28,
and page 114, lines 1 1*2).
In its 1989 decision the court identified two distinct species
of harm absent an injundtiOM. The first harm was the fact that the

19

pestina aroundm of the California Gull population would be.

14 adversely impacted. (emphasis added)
15
It seamed logical to the court that if 50% to 704 of the
18 California Gulls at Mono Lake nested on those four islets and they
17 become land bridged :because of a drop in lake level, that would
18 have an adverse impact on their nesting grounds. Respondents'
18 _expert, Dr. Jehl, also believed that habitat was limiting but
20 apparently no longer.holds that opinion. It is not clear why Dr.
21

Jehl has changed his opinion, but it may well be the fact that in

22 the 2980's the population survived and seemed to maintain itself.
29

In 1990, for reasons no one is prepared to explain, the largest

24

ever fledgling population at the lake was documented.

25

The court does not want to seem flip in its comments, but

28 after hearing all the experts' testimony concerning the California
27 Gulls at mono Lake, the court was as much impressed with what they
an

7
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did not know or could not explain as with what they did know.

2 There are good reasons for that. Dr. Jehl, who is an eminent
3 authority on birds,
4
5

a

is still studying the California Cull. As

noted until recently he believed habitat was limiting; he has
apparently changed that opinion. No expert could testify with
clarity whether the California Cull population at mono Lake was
self-sustaining, or whether immigration was necessary to sustain

7
a healthy colony. As more study is done, Dr. Jehl, Dr. Winkler,
and Mr. Shuford will undoubtedly add to the body of knowledge
concerning the California Culls at Mono Lake. If history repeats

10
11

itself, opinions may continue to evolve and change.
What history does teach is that when islands are landbridged

12 and coyotes can invade, the gulls abandon those islands as nesting
13 grounds. How quickly they return appears to depend on a number of
14 factors which the experts may not yet understand. To allow
16 continued lindbridging of some or all of the four islets will have
16 a negative impact on . the nesting grounds. Whether the California
17 Culls would continue to flourish as they did this year or suffer
18 a substantial population decline is unknown. It would seem logical
19 that the public trust would dictate that the nesting grounds be
20 protected. That the gulls be allowed to nest and rear their chicks
21

in the 'nasty of the islets, for there are no guarantees that if

22 the nesting grounds for DO% to 70% of the California Culls at Mono
23
24
26

'Lake is lost for even a short time that whatever the conditions
were that caused the bumper crop of fledglings in 1990, which we
do not understand,

28 differently there

Will also

be repeated. To put it somewhat

is simply too much we don't understand about the

27
06

a
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1

California Gull and its nesting habits to allow us to roll the dice

2

by landbridging the islets. and hoping for the best. , •
The second harm the court noted.in its 1989 decision dealt

3
4
5
6

with air quality problems caused by dust storms. These • dust storms
occur when fine particles of dust are put in the air by a process

known as saltation. . . ii beyond dispute that air quality
standards have on occasion been violated in the Mono Basin. What

7

9

percentage of time or days this occurs is open to honest debate.
However, there are some facts that are not open to dispute.
Because of the gentle slope, of the lake bed at the elevation

10 it is now, and will be as the lake drops, if the injunction is not
11 granted, a large increase in exposed playa will result. The more
12 playa that Is exposed the greater _fetch the wind has and the
13 greater the area of exposed efflorescent crust. These are the
14 factors that petitioners (trifle will guarantee increased violation
15 of the air - quality standards in the Mono Basin.
16

•

Respondente camper...Mono Basin air quality with . the_ air

17 quality in other air quality districts and conclude that because
18 the Mono Basin air

is of substantially better quality, there is

19 nothing to worry about. Respondents , experts testified that there
20 are several reasons there should be no concern on the court's part
21

if the standards are exceeded.

22

First, they testified that the standards are only slightly

23

exceeded on any given occurrence and that those occurrences are

(r1 24

rare. Further, because of the direction the wind blows the dust

25 is generally away tram any population center. In fact, it blows
26 over largely uninhabited land. The last argument they tender is
27 that for the dust to cause the harm Sought to be avoided by the
ein

9
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1 standards, a person would have to breath the air 24 hours a day

for

2 70 years; thus, they argue the health risks from the dust storms
3 are de minimis and ought to be ignored by the court.
4

It must, however, be recognized that the Public Trust values

5 have not been weighed and that any exceeding on an ongoing basis
6
7
8

of the air quality standards caused by the lowering of the lake
level, even though it occurs only occasionally, violates the
standards lawfully adopted by the Great Basin Air Quality Pollution.
Control District. There is little doubt that if respondent were

9
applying for a new permit and license to divert water or to build

/0
11
12
13

a facility that would cause the air quality standards to be
exceeded, those permits would not be forthcoming until provision
for some offsetting mitigation measures had been made. Does the
status quo require the court to allow two more years of occasional •

14 violations of air quality standards? One may assume that with the
16 increased exposure of playa and the increased wind fetch the
16 incidents of dust storms may increase and they may become more
17 intense; e.g., the standards may be violated more frequently and
18 the extent to which they are exceeded may increase.
19

.Aside from the dancer risk created by the airborne dust

20 particles containing arsenic, there is also the aesthetic
21 consideration. Certainly on those days when dust storms occur they
22 are not pleasing to the senses. Although this may to some seem a
23 ' minor consideration, to the tourist hoping to visit an area of
24 great scenic beauty At may constitute a real inconvenience.
25

As to the effect: the denial of an injunction would have on the

26 limnology of the lake, the court does not believe there
27
2/1

10

is enough
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way or the other on which to base an informed

2 decision.
3

Absent an injunction the aesthetics of the Mono Basin will be

4

adversely affected. The dust storms have already been mentioned;

5
6
7
8
9

in

addition large bog-like areas will result along the shoreline

of the lake, making it difficult for many visitors to access much
of the lake. The court does not concern itself withwhat some
expert has opined should be the ideal visual experience or at what
level the like provides the greatest scenic resource. The court
seriously doubts the average tourist would recognize a difference

10 in any scenic value..over the next two

or-

three years if the

Cu injunction was denied.
(
12
One last area concerning the status quo should be touched on
13 by the court. Because of the Federal Reliction Doctrine, the state
14

has

lost to date about 24,500 acres of land. If the injunction is

15 denied and the lake level drops further, because of the gentle
16 slope of the lake bed at elevations between 6370 and 6300 feet,
17 another several thousand acres of land will pass into federal
18 ownership. The State Lands Commission holds this property in
19 trust. The State Lands Commission could not allow the loss of
20 thousands of acres of public lands without committing waste, one
21 may well ask what difference does it make if the land is under
22 state or federal ownership? The difference

1s

that under state

23 ownership it is protected by public trust values; under federal
IA not.
24 ownership it

25
26
27
AO

Counsel for respondent sees this concern as a red herring.
The assumption is made that if the land passes to federal ownership
when the lake level drops it may well pass back to state ownership
11
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1

when it rises. The logic of that assumption has not been tested

2

in the courts. While it may be reaching, it is not beyond

3

possibility that the federaltgovernment would do something along

4

the shoreline of the lake that would be contrary to public trust
values. For instance, the federal government could build a

5

research or testing facility that Would be incompatible with the
8
7

scenic value of the lake. History supports this supposition.
After World War II the United States Navy constructed a facility
on the . shore of the lake, the concrete abutments of which still

9

exist. The remains of that facility, in the court's opinion, do

10

not enhance nor are they compatible with the scenic values the

11

public trust would seek to preserve.

12

While the court agrees with respondent that any adverse impact

13

caused by federal ownership is remote, it nevertheless is possible.

14

The long and short of it is the fact that if the injunction is

15

denied several thousand more acres of state owned land will be lost

16

to public trust protection.

17
18

BATANCTNA THR EOUITIza

If the injunction is denied and the lake is allowed to recede

19

further, there is an obvious threat to its value as an economic,

20

recreational and scenic resource. (Nationpil Audubon society

21

Superior Court (1983) 33 Ca1.3d 419 at 431). The question is

22

whether the threat is of irreparable harm and is this harm when

23

weighed against the loss to respondent justifiable. Nmt4onal

24
25
26

Aultubnn supra at page 426 instructs "that 'before state courts
...approve water diveisions they should consider the effect of such
diversions upon the interests protected by the public trust, and

27
•II• alb

v.

12

/Th
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•

attempt, so far as feasible, to avoid or minimize any harm to those

2

interests."

3

The potential harm caused by the denial of an injunction has

4

already been discussed. .Is it feasible to avoid or minimize that

6

harm? The answer is yes. The question then becomes whether it is

6
7

equitable to do so in light of respondents , historic use of
diverted water and the cost to it resulting from the loss of that
water.

8
9
10
11
(n

Recall that respondent argues if the injunction is granted and
the level of the lake is restored to 6377 feet, it will lose some
96,300 acre filet of water and incur a cost of 34 million dollars.
Petitioner Audubon hotly contests those figures.

12

First it should be stated that the interim stream flows of

13

approximately 60,000 acre feet of water will not restore the lake

14

to 6377 feet. To restore the lake to 6377 feet, the level ordered

16

by the court in 1989, will require approximately 63,000 acre feet

16

of water. In reality the status quo would be a lake level of 6377

17

feet had the respondent been able to comply with the court's 1989

18

order. No fault can justifiably be placed on respondent when the

19 water was not available to allow it to comply. But the court is
20

not convinced that respondent should now be able to complain that

21

since it was not able to comply with the court's previous order it

22 would be unfair to make it do so now. Further it should be noted,

(

23

that if the mandates of Cal Trout T and /I had been complied with

(-, 24

in a timely fashion, even less water would have been needed to

25

comply with this court's 1989 order. (California Trout. inc. V.

26

state Water Wesourren Control Bnerg (1989] 207 Cal.App. 3d 383);

27
9R

13
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1

(Cal1fern4m Trout. Inc. V. Superior Court [1990] 218 Cal.App. 3d

2

187).

3

If the court's 1989 order had been met and the lake was at

4

6377 feet, the water neceisary to maintain it at that level pending

5
6
7

the Water Resources Board's hearings, in addition to the water
already mandated by the interim stream flows, would be less than
respondent gives to the operation of Cain Ranch for the raising of
sheep. The court uses the word "gives" advisably. The evidence

6
established that respondent receives about $30,000 a year for the

9
10
11
12

lease of Cain Ranch. Along with the use of the land itself, (using
respondents' own values of water), respondent supplies ("gives")
the lessee approximately 10,000 acre feet of water worth in excess
of two million dollars. If such a use of water does not constitute

13

outright waste, it seems to make little sense when one weighs the

14

water needs of respondent.

15

When One places the interests at stake in this action in the

16

balance, there is little doubt the equities favor petitioners.

17

Once the level of Mono Lake is restored to 6377 feet, and the

18

interim stream flows are maintained as ordered by the court, the

19

cost to respondent to maintain 6377 feet is de minimis. One could

20

argue that the cost, should be measured by the $30,000 per year

21

respondent receives for rent on vain Ranch.

22

Before issuing its 1989 injunctive order the court carefully

29

weighed the cost to respondent against the harm to the environment

24

of Mono Basin. The court found then as it does now that a national

25

environmental, ecological and scenic treasure should not be

26

experimented with even for a few brief years. without an

27

injunctive order much of the publics trust values that must be

it
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I considered would be ignored and ultimately go unprotected for years

2 beyond 1992. For fla gons stated before, the court believes this
3 constitutes irreparable harm.
•.

4

It should not be forgotten that 6377 feet is simply a minimum

5

level necessary to protect the resources at Mono Lake. it may well

6
7
8
9
10

(

be that after the public trust values have been weighed by the
Water Resources Board, it may conclude that 6377 feet is not
adequate to protect those values. That is a decision this court
need not make. The court, however, does believe that petitioners
stand an excellent chance in the State Water Board hearings of
establishing that 6377 feet is an absolute minimum elevation

11 required to protect the environment and thus protect the public
C12 trust value. Further, the court, believes petitioners have an
13 excellent chance of prevailing on the merits at trial.
14

15

coxeriasiou

It

is'

feasible to minimize the harm to the Mono Basin

16 environment. Ecological values can be protected. Irreparable harm
17 can be avoided. The cost to respondent is nominal when one
18 considers what is at stake. Other water is available to respondent

19 even during these drought conditions. The likelihood of
20 petitioners prevailing on the merits is good. The'status quo as
21 set forth above must be preserved. A Preliminary Injunction shall
22 issue.
29
24 Dated; April 17, 1991

C25
26
27
28
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The American River Decision:
Balancing Instream Protection with
Other Competing Beneficial Uses
Stuart L. Somach
Attorney at Law
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ABSTRACT: Litigation on the American River in California has focused upon
the conflict between instream resources and other consumptive beneficial uses.
In that litigation the court has fashioned a "physical solution" intended to
accommodate the competing uses rather than deciding between them. The success of the physical solution will depend, in large part, on the cooperation of
entities not parties to the litigation and on the parties' own willingness to be
bound by the limitations imposed by the court. There are indications, in this
regard, that most involved in the effort are moving forward carefully but in a
manner consistent with the court's determination.
KEY WORDS: "Best-available source," cumulative impact, "physical solution," public trust doctrine.

INTRODUCTION

Balancing consumptive uses with instream protections is one of the major
environmental challenges of the 1990's. In
California most streams have been appropriated with little, if any, consideration of
the potential instream consequences of the
appropriation. With the development of a
strong environmental movement, in the
late 1960's, came a greater degree of sensitivity to the environmental consequences of water diversions. This sensitivity has led to consideration of instream
needs in the current appropriation process.
Resolution of conflicts between consumptive and instream needs, however, is
not always easy or possible. The increased
need for domestic water supplies in California's growing population centers, coupled with stringent regulation of drinking
water quality, has compounded the complexity of these conflicts. Simple allocation
solutions, to the extent that they ever existed, no longer solve the problems posed
because the quantity of water taken from
Rivers • Volume 1, Number 4

the stream is no longer the sole question
that needs to be answered. In addition to
quantity is the question "from what location shall the water be taken?"
Entities with a responsibility to supply
public drinking water argue that water
must be diverted from the "best available
source," a public health concept that is
based upon the physical reality that the
higher up in a watershed one goes to divert
a water supply, the fewer contaminants or
pollutants there are to be dealt with
through the treatment process. The consequences of applying this theory on a
broad scale are obvious. Increased upstream diversions not only affect areas of
great environmental sensitivity, but also
reduce or eliminate flows throughout a
stream system.
Resolution of this conflict was the focus
of litigation, in California, that pitted the
protection of instream values on the American River against the water quality needs
of a major San Francisco area water agency,
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the East Bay Municipal Utility District (EB- vide a means of dealing with conflicts of
MUD). In that litigation, the court fash- this nature.
ioned a "physical solution" that may pro-

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The American River rises in the Sierra
Nevada and flows westward to its confluence with the Sacramento River. It was on
the American River that John Marshall, in
1848, discovered gold, and it was between
the American and Sacramento rivers where
the capitol of California was established
and now prospers. The American River has
been the focal point of significant California and American history and has been the
subject of landmark judicial decisions. For
example, in People v. Goldnin (66 Cal. 155,
4 P. 1150 [1884]), the California Supreme
Court determined that mining sediment
associated with placer mining in the motherlode was a nuisance that impeded the
utilization of water for the State's infant
agricultural industry. Ma consequence, the

court enjoined the upstream mining practices, to the extent they interfered with the
use of water for agriculture, thereby aiding
agriculture's rise as California's number
one industry. People v. Goldrun was also cited and accepted by the California Supreme
Court as an early assertion of California's
public trust doctrine in the Mono Lake case
(National Audubon Society v. Superior Court,

33 Ca1.3d 419 [19831).
In recent years, the American River has
been the focus of intense water development activities. Figure 1 is a schematic map
of portions of the American River, showing the relative location of water development facilities and proposed diversion
points as well as areas of environmental
concern.

WATER DEVELOPMENT

Folsom Dam was authorized in 1949 as
United States Bureau of Reclamation
(USBR) multiple purpose reclamation project (Pub. L. No. 81-356). As part of this
legislation, Congress also directed the
USBR to determine if further water development on the American River was possible. As a result of the USBR's continued
work, the Auburn-Folsom South Unit was
authorized by Congress in 1965 (Pub. L.
No. 89-161). The main features of this project were Auburn Dam and Reservoir (upstream from Folsom Dam) and the FolsomSouth Canal, a conveyance facility located
downstream of Folsom Dam.
By 1956, Folsom Dam was completed and
in operation. Construction of the FolsomSouth Canal commenced in 1968, and 27
a

miles of the canal were completed. However, in 1972, further construction was enjoined until the USBR completed an adequate Environmental Impact Statement
(EIS) (See NRDC v. Stamm, 6 ERC 1525, 4
Evel. L. Rep. 20, 463 [E.D. Cal. 1974]). To
date, the Department of the Interior has
not completed this ES. Construction of the
Auburn Dam started in 1967. Concern over
the seismic safety of the dam, however,
brought the project to a standstill. The dam
has never been completed and the present
estimated cost to complete construction is
far in excess of the authorized cost ceiling.
Finishing Auburn Dam will require additional authorization and appropriations by
Congress before further construction can
proceed.

AMERICAN RIVER AND AMERICAN RIVER PARKWAY
The 23 miles of the American River below Folsom Dam (the lower American River) is the major focus of environmental

ti-
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concern. The City of Sacramento and the
Sacramento County, from as early as 1915,
planned for development of recreational
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FIGURE 1. American River water demands: existing and potential.

sites along the American River. After the
closure of Folsom Dam, pressure for urban
development adjacent to the river spurred
efforts to preserve open space along the
river. In 1959, Sacramento County established a Department of Parks and Recreation to develop a detailed park plan
along the American River. A systematic
land acquisition program followed, and by
1986 Sacramento County had acquired over
4,000 acres of parkway land.
Today the American River Parkway consists of a series of 14 connected parks comprising a complete riparian corridor along
both sides of the American River from Folsom Dam to the confluence of the American with the Sacramento River. The lower
23 miles, from Nimbus Dam to the river's
mouth, are administered by Sacramento
County. In 1981 the Secretary of the Interior also designated the lower 23 miles
of the American River below Nimbus Dam
as a recreational river under the National
Wild and Scenic Rivers Act (16 U.S.C. I
1271 et seq.). In 1972, the California Legislature included the same segment in the
State Wild and Scenic system (Cal. Pub.
Res. Code ft 5093.50, 5093.54fe]). The lower American River was statutorily designated as a "recreational" river in the state
system in 1982 (Cal. Pub. Res. Code §
5093.545).
I S. L. Somach

Recreation
The American River Parkway runs
through the center of the Sacramento metropolitan area. The parkway is managed to
balance the dual goals of preserving natural or open space and protecting environmental quality within the urban environment, at the same time contributing to
recreational opportunities in the Sacramento area, including rafting, canoeing,
kayaking, swimming, wading, and fishing,
as well as biking, hiking, picnicking, and
sight-seeing. The parkway contains both
developed parks and areas set aside in their
natural condition. The Jedediah Smith Bicycle Trail permits users to bicycle the entire length of the parkway.
Riparian Vegetation and Wildlife
The riparian vegetation acts as a buffer
between the lower American River and the
surrounding urban development. This
vegetation and the river itself are the most
prominent features of the Parkway and
contribute greatly to recreational experiences. Many species of wildlife use the riparian vegetation for sources of food, cover, nesting sites, roosting areas, and
migratory corridors.
The parkway supports a wide variety of
253 I

birds and wildlife. More than 220 bird species have been recorded. Sacramento
County estimates that 30 mammal species,
13 reptile species, and 6 amphibian species
also inhabit the parkway. The riparian habitat is important not only as breeding
grounds for resident animals, but also as
wintering grounds and migratory corndon for nonresident species. The parkway
includes a number of off-channel ponds
that have high wildlife value.
Fisheries
The lower American River has 41 reported species of fish. Of these species, nine
are anadromous (they live mainly in salt
water but ascend freshwater rivers to
spawn). The most abundant anadromous
game fish that use the river are chinook
salmon, American shad, and steelhead
trout.
The lower American River chinook
salmon run is one of the state's most valuable fisheries, supporting significant commercial and sport fisheries in the Pacific

Ocean and in the lower American River.
Although some adult salmon may be found
in the river year around, the population is
mainly the fall-run species. The fall-run
adult salmon begin to enter the river in
September. Spawning occurs through January, and incubation and rearing of juvenile salmon extends through mid-July.
American shad support a popular sport
fishery in the lower American River. The
shad fishery draws anglers from throughout Northern California. Adult American
shad enter the lower American River in
May and June to spawn. Water temperature is a key factor affecting spawning and
egg development of American shad.
Steelhead trout support a popular sport
fishery in the lower American River. The
main run of adult steelhead enter the river
in the winter and early spring to spawn.
The juvenile steelhead rears in freshwater
for at least a year before emigrating to the
ocean. The steelhead trout, like the chinook salmon, is a coldwater fish whose various life stages are affected by water temperature.

EFFORTS TO PROTECT INSTREAM RESOURCES
The instream values associated with the Fish and Game (250 cfs from 1 January
lower American River have, of course, been through 14 September, and 500 cfs from
recognized for a long time Also obvious, 15 September through 31 December).
In 1970, the SWRCB issued Decision 1356
for some time, was the intention to divert
water from the lower American River for (D-1356), granting the USBR water rights
consumptive purposes. Table 1 quantifies permits for Auburn Dam. The board also
the amount of water either under contract reserved jurisdiction for the purpose of
or for which entities have requested con- formulating terms and conditions relative
tracts from Folsom Reservoir. Also shown to flows to be maintained in the lower
is the amount of water that is held by en- American River for recreational purposes
tities other than the USBR. Most, if not all, and for the protection and enhancement
of this water was intended for diversion of fish and wildlife. These flows were actually established in 1972 by Decision 1400
above the mouth of the American River.
Concerns were expressed about the po- (D-1400).
In 13-1400 flows for fisheries were estabtential adverse effects of these diversions
on the lower American River from the be- lished at 1250 cis from 15 October through
ginning of the USSR's development ef- 14 July and at 800 cfs from 15 July through
forts. In 1958, the California State Water 14 October. Minimum recreation flows
Resources Control Board (SWRCB) issued were set at 1,500 cfs. Recreation flows could
Decision 893 (0-893), granting permits to be eliminated and fishery flows reduced
the USSR for storage of water at Folsom. during dry years, assuming the USSR also
The USSR's permits were subject to mini- reduced deliveries to its water supply cusmum flows for fisheries resources, as pro- tomers. The flows in D-1400 were based on
vided for in a memorandum between the the assumption that Auburn Dam would
USSR and the California Department of be built and apply only to the USSR's AuI
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burn permits. Because Auburn Dam has
not been constructed, the D-1400 flows are
not legally binding upon the USBR, and
the lower D-893 flows currently control releases to the river.
In 1972, the USBR entered into a water
supply contract with EBMUD. EBMUD's
contract calls for the delivery of 150,000
acre-feet of American River water from the

Folsom-South Canal. The only other longterm contract on the Folsom-South Canal
is held by the Sacramento Municipal Utility Distnct for its Rancho Seco Nuclear
Power Plant. That contract provides for
75,000 acre-feet annually (afa), although
only a small fraction of that water has ever
been taken. The EBMUD contract resulted
in extensive litigation.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY OF THE LITIGATION
Like many water cases, this litigation has
a long judicial history. Filed in 1972 (Environmental Defense Fund, Inc., et al. v. East
Bay Municipal Utility District, et al. [Super.
Ct. Alameda County, No. 425955]), the case
has been before the California Supreme
Court on two occasions, and before the
United States Supreme Court once, all on
pleadings issues. The actual trial of this
matter commenced in 1984, but the case
was then referred to the SWRCB, as referee. The Reference proceedings, before the
SWRCB, required 31/2 years and resulted in
a five-volume report, to which all parties
took exceptions.
The original Complaint was filed by numerous environmental groups, including
the Environmental Defense Fund (EDF)
and Save the American River Association
(SARA), and it focused on allegations that
EBMUD's decision to seek a supplemental
supply of water from the American River
violated Article X, section 2 of the California Constitution, as well as various provisions of the California Water Code, because of the location of the point of
diversion at the Folsom-South Canal, upstream from the lower American River.
Shortly after the environmentalists' complaint had been filed, Sacramento County
intervened on behalf of the plaintiffs, adding allegations to those already at issue,
focusing on the 23 miles of the lower
American River that were used by the public for scenic and recreational purposes, including boating, swimming, and fishing.
The County also alleged that it had acquired land and expended funds for a
parkway along the lower American River;
that the 150,000 acre-feet contracted for by
EBMUD, if taken from the Folsom-South
Canal, would not be available for flows in
I
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the lower American River; and that D-1400
flows were less than those necessary for
optimum conditions for fish and recreation.
In its first decision in this case, the California Supreme Court affirmed judgment
in favor of EBMUD (Environmental Defense
Fund, Inc. v. East Bay Municipal Utility District [1977] 20 Ca1.3d 327 [EDF ID. The Supreme Court held that the water diversion
issues were preempted by federal law. In
1978, the United States Supreme Court vacated the judgment in EDF I and remanded
the case to the California Supreme Court
for further consideration in light of the
United States Supreme Court's decision in
California v. United States ((1978] 438 U.S.
645) (Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. East
Bay Municipal Utility District [1978] 439 U.S.
811).
On remand, the California Supreme
Court reversed its earlier decision (Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. East Bay Municipal Utility District [1980] 26 Ca1.3d 183
(EDT II]). The Supreme Court ruled that to
the extent the complaints "challenge the
location of the diversion point as being
violative of California law, there is no federal preemption" (EDT II at 193).
Following the decision in EDT II, plaintiffs filed amended complaints. These complaints alleged that seeking a supplemental supply of water from the Amencan River
to be diverted in a manner that would not
allow the water to flow down the lower
American River constituted an abuse of
discretion and was an unreasonable diversion and use of water. The amended complaint was based on the argument that the
proposed decision would reduce flows in
the lower American River, causing harm
to irtstream values.
255

TABLE

USBR projected 2020 American River service area needs (1,000 acre-feet annually).

•
Agency

Contractual
and water
rights
entitlements

Placer County CVP Water
Placer County Water Rights
Natomas Ditch Diversion
North Fork Ditch (San Juan)
Folsom Prison
El Dorado County CVP
El Dorado Water Rights
City of Roseville
Subtotal
City of Folsom
Mather Air Force Base

, 117.0
120.0
32.06
33.0
4.0
7.5
47.5
32.0
393.0
0.0'
0.0
Multi-district area
San Juan Suburban Water District
11.2
0.0
Citizens Utility Company •
Northridge Water District
0.0
0.0
McClellan Air Force Base
0.0
Rio Linda County Water District
Subtotal (from Folsom lake)
11.2
Sacramento County Water Agency
0.0
FSC-Sacramento County Irrigation
0.0
Area 1
0.0
Area 3
0.0
Omochumne-Hartnell Water District
0.0
Galt Irrigation District
0.0
Clay Water District
0.0
City of Galt
0.0
Laguna/Elk Grove
0.0
Sunrise East Area
0.0
Subtotal (Agriculture)
0.0
Subtotal (Municipal & Industrial)
Subtotal (Sacramento County Water Agency)
FSC-EBMUD
150.0
FSC-SMUD
75.04
FSC-Losses ,
20.0
230.0
City of Sacramento
Carmichael Water District
10.8'
41.0
• Riparian
Subtotal
526.8
San Joaquin County
North San Joaquin Water
0.0
Conservation District
0,0
Woodbridge area
0,0
Stockton East Water District
Central San Joaquin Water
0.0
Conservation District
San Joaquin County Flood and Water
0.0
Conservation District
Subtotal
0.0
0.0
Stockton East Water District
0.0
Subtotal (San Joaquin County)

Additional
need'

Total need

0.0
20.9
0.4

117.0
120.0
32.0
33.0
4.0
7.5
47.5
32.0
393.0
20.9
0.4

26.1
21.6
13.2
2.5
6.8
91.5

37.3
21.6
13.2
2.5
6.8
102.7

29.0
46.0
12.0
31.0
2.7
9.9
77.7
17.2
120.7
104.8
225.5
4.2
4.2

0.0
29.0
46.0
12.0
31.0
2.7
9.9
77.7
17.2
120.7
104.8
225.5
150.0
75.0
20.0
230.0
15.0
41.0
531.0

57.0
13.0
49.0

57.0
13.0
49.0

22.0

22.0

31.0
172.0
49.0
221.0

31.0
172.0
49.0
221.0

fTh
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TABLE I
Continued.

Contractual
and water
rights
entitlements

Agency

Additional
need'

Total need

292.7
Total Agriculture
249.5
Total KO
1,471.2
542.2
931.0
Total—American River
• Based on U.S. Bureau of Reclamation (1988) (except for Carmichael Water District).
City of Folsom Water Right (22,000), Southern California Water Co. (10,000).
Included in Natomas Ditch Diversion.
• Includes 15,000 acre-feet water right (city of Sacramento).
• Reported by Carmichael Water District.

In 1984, based upon the County of Sacramento's motion for an Order Referring
Issues to the State Water Resources Control
Board, pursuant to Water Code section 2000
et seq., the matter was referred to the
SWRCB. Twenty-one specific issues, in-

duding both factual and legal matters, were
referred to the State Board as referee! After
the SWRCB rendered its report, a trial de
novo began in the Alameda County Superior Court on exceptions to the report
filed by the parties.

THE SUPERIOR COURTS DECISION

In January 1990 the Superior Court issued its Statement of Decision, in which
certain limitations were placed upon EBMUD's ability to divert water upstream
from the mouth of the American River. In
reaching his decision, the Superior Court
Judge, Richard A. Hodge, attempted to
achieve a balance by protecting instream
interests while accommodating the uncertainties associated with the water quality
issues raised by EBMUD. In so doing, Judge
Hodge addressed the relative positions of
the parties.
Sacramento County's Position
Sacramento County and the other plaintiffs and intervenors asserted the following
positions:
1. EBMUD's diversion along and together with other existing and projected diversions will harm instream values - in the lower
American River.
2. EBMUD has reasonable, feasible alternative points of diversion,
downstream from the mouth of the
American River, from the Sacramento River and the Delta.
S. L. Somach

3. Any legitimate water quality concerns that EBMUD may have can be
dealt with through treatment or
through blending with high quality water EBMUD has from other
sources.
EBMUD's Position
EBMUD asserted the following positions:
1. EBMUD's exercise of its contractual
right to divert water from the Folsom-South Canal will not cause incremental harm to instream resources.
2. Any cumulative impact of diversions on the lower American River
In November 1985 the Superior Court granted
leave to the California Department of Fish and
Game to intervene for the limited purpose of
addressing issues related to the protection and
enhancement of the State's fish, wildlife resources, and associated recreational activities in
the lower American River. On 16 June 1986 the
California State Lands Commission was also
granted leave to intervene on a limited basis
related to riparian issues.
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can only be addressed if all existing
and future diverters, including the
USSR, are involved.
3. There are no reasonable, feasible al-

THE

and the concept of "best available
source."

counts ANALYSIS

In attempting to frame the issues before
him, in light of the parties' asserted positions, Judge Hodge stated, "[p]robably no
party would disagree with Sacramento
County that the focus of this case is on the
public trust impacts and constitutional
'reasonableness' of EBMUD's proposal to
take water through the Folsom-South Canal" (Statement of Decision at 23).
In California, the public trust doctrine
protects ecological, recreational, commercial, navigational, and fishery values in the
navigable waters of the state (National Audubon Society v. Superior Court, 33 CaL3d 419
[1983]). Judge Hodge had to coordinate the
public trust doctrine with the "reasonable
use" doctrine found in Article X, section 2
of the California Constitution, which requires that (1) waste or unreasonable use
or unreasonable method of use of water be
prevented, (2) the consumption of water
be exercised with a view to the reasonable
and beneficial use, and (3) water resources
be put to beneficial use to the fullest extent
of which they are capable (Statement of
Decision at 27-28).
The court, following Audubon, concluded that the first goal of any court in applying these doctrines is to attempt to accommodate the competing interests rather
than deciding between them. In adopting
this view, Judge Hodge, in essence, accepted the first part of the proposition offered by Sacramento County and other
plaintiffs, that the court postulated in its
entirety as follows:
1. Audubon requires that in the allocation of water resources, the state has a duty
to protect public trust uses whenever feasible, and to attempt, so far as feasible, to
avoid or minimize any harm to those interests;
2. BAWD has feasible alternative diversion sites;
3. Therefore, EBMUD may not divert at
the Fo/som-South Canal (Statement of Decision at 28).
Riven

ternatives to the Folsom-South Canal Diversion, if one considers costs

The court, however, rejected the second
and third aspects of the syllogism, that the
only way to achieve protection for the lower American River was to make EBMUD
divert its water below the confluence of
the American and Sacramento riven. Judge
Hodge stated:

gy protection of public trust values can be
accomplished consistently with the diversion at Folsom-South Canal, then plaintiffs
and intervenors can have no sustainable
complaint. In the absence of an unnecessary diminution of public trust values,
plaintiff's demand for a different diversion
site has no supportable legal foundation.
In the absence of harm, plaintiff is not entitled simply to achieve a different diversion site as a question of policy or preference (Statement of Decision at 28).
The goal, therefore, was to find a solution that would avoid adverse effects on
the instream values of the lower American
River without forcing EBMUD to an alternative location. Assuming this could be accomplished, the court would then not have
to face or resolve problems with respect to
water quality and costs alleged to be associated with alternative points of diversion.
Judge Hodge chose to reach this goal
through adaptation of the doctrine of
"physical solution." The traditional application of this doctrine was developed to
further the mandate of Article X, section 2
of avoiding the waste of water. The doctrine requires a court to determine, in any
water rights litigation, means to avoid
waste while at the same time not unreasonably and adversely affecting the vested
property rights of the paramount right
holder. Judge Hodge adopted this doctrine
and applied it to protect instream uses
while still allowing EBMUD the option to
divert water from the Folsom-South Canal.
The court indicated that the physical solution was mandated by Article X, section
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2 of the California Constitution, in conjunction with the public trust doctrine and
represented "an absolute condition of diversion by EBMUD" (Statement of Decision at 108). The physical solution adopted
by the court, in relevant part, is as follows:
PHYSICAL SOLUTION
Physical Solution shall be accomplished as
follows:
1. EBMUD may divert not to exceed
150,000 acre-feet annually (AM) from the
Folsom-South Canal pursuant to its contract of December 22nd, 1970, with the U.S.
Bureau of Reclamation.
2. The following instream flow requirements must be met throughout the lower
American River as a condition of diversion:
A. October 15th through February, 2000
CFS;
B. March through June, 3000 CFS;
C. July through October 15th, 1750 CFS;
3. An additional 60,000 AM will be maintained in reserve at the reservoir from midOctober through June for release upon the
recommendation of the Department of Fish
and Game in response to specific fishery
requirements.
4. EBMUD shall use its best efforts to divert as much water as possible during those
times when instream flows are least required for the protection of environmental
interests and public trust values.
5. The instrearn flow conditions set forth
above are not intended to constitute operational flows that are to be met in every
month of every year without regard to the
hydrologic conditions that might prevail
at any given time. The court anticipates
that operational criteria will need to be
established, based upon the various hydrologic year types (critically dry, dry, below normal, above normal, etc.) to ensure
that Folsom Reservoir is not emptied and
that there are flows available in the river
whenever possible. However, the court intends that the instream flow requirements
set forth above remain the standard that
should be maintained to the fullest possible extent. Moreover, the court intends
that the instream flow requirements be an
absolute limit on EBMUD's ability to divert
water from the Folsom-South Canal. When
the instream flow requirements cannot be
met, EBMUD may not divert any part of
its appropriation.
[ S. L. Somach

6. Defendants shall not divert water except to meet the demands for customers
within the EBMUD utility district.
7. EBMUD shall not market nor sell any
part of its water diverted hereunder to any
third party.
8. All parties hereto shall cooperate in the
development and implementation of scientific studies pertaining to the fish, wildlife and habitat issues which have been
identified in this litigation. These studies
shall be under the supervision of the special master. EBMUD shall contribute its fair
share of the cost of programs to maintain
a viable fishery and riparian habitat in the
lower American River. EBMUD's "fair
share" shall be determined by a comparison with contributions by other users and
agencies and upon the recommendation of
the special master with regard to individual projects.
9. The court retains jurisdiction for the
purpose of implementing the Physical Solution and providing for its modification
in light of the scientific studies required
in paragraph 8, and in light of the studies
and information which may be developed
by various of the interested governmental
agencies as well as the parties.
/0. The Court is mindful that the strict
adherence to the flow regimen could, in
some circumstances, affect carryover storage in Folsom Reservoir and reduce the
availability of water for instream public
trust uses in subsequent months. It is the
intention of the Court, however, to maintain the indicated flow regimen in the absence of convincing evidence, presented
through the Special Master, that diversions accomplished during any particular
month will adversely affect the ability to
meet the Court's mandated flow levels in
subsequent months.
11. Notwithstanding any other provisions
of this Physical Solution, it is anticipated
that during certain "dry year periods,
modification of the flow regimens herein
may be permitted in limited circumstances
to accommodate EBMUD. At such times of
crises, and with the guidance of the special
master, the court may temporarily modify
the flow regimen if such modification can
be effected without substantial harm to the
fishery, habitat and other public trust values identified herein. Any such modification will be temporary and only in response to a showing of significant, specific,
and immediate health risks to EBMUD. In
evaluating circumstances in which a modification may be indicated, recreational in259

terests identified herein may be accorded
a lower priority than they would otherwise obtain.
12. The court appoints [a] special master
to aid and advise this court in the implementation of the Physical Solution. His
duties shall include the development, coordination and monitoring of scientific research to determine optimum flows, releases, and storage patterns designed to
protect the public trust values; the coordination of said studies with those of other
agencies; advising the court as to developments affecting the rights of the parties
hereto; evaluating dry-year flows and release patterns, and advising the court as to
necessary modifications; and such other
duties as the parties may request and the
court require, consistent with the Physical
Solution.
13. Each party may nominate an individ-

ual whose responsibility will be to communicate with the Special Master in the
implementation of the Physical Solution.
Said individuals will communicate regularly with the Special Master and will advance the recommendations of the parties
with respect to any matters pertaining to
the Physical Solution. Nothing contained
in this Physical Solution, however, shall
limit the right of the parties to file motions
directly with the Court pursuant to its continuing jurisdiction.
The foregoing flow regimen is not merely
interim in nature. It is intended as a permanent constitutionally mandated prerequisite to diversion, modifiable only upon
the presentation of convincing evidence
which demonstrates the need for such
modification in accordance with the foregoing provisions of the Physical Solution
(Statement of Decision at 108-111).

FUTURE CONCERNS

Judgment in the case was not entered
until May 1990. Since January 1990, when
the Statement of Decision was issued, the
Special Master has been very active in initiating the studies called for within the
physical solution. Moreover, Sacramento
County and EBMUD have, for an interim
period, agreed to evenly split all of the
' Special Master's costs.
In fashioning such a physical solution,
Judge Hodge has in essence challenged all
of the parties to work constructively toward a long-term solution to the problems
presented. A major issue dealt with in the
opinion, but not directly resolved in the
physical solution, is the problems associated with cumulative impacts. Cumulative
impacts are impacts to instream resources
caused by the total diversions within a system as opposed to the incremental impact
of any one diversion. Cumulative impacts
on the lower American River would include all of the diversions noted in Table
1. In this regard, the court noted:
Finally the evidence is overwhelming
that the cumulative impact of EHMUD's
diversion along with those consumptive
demands projected over the next few decades would cause irreparable damage to
the American River, its fisheries and its
riparian habitat. Consequently, both Ar-
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tide X. section 2 and [the] public trust doctrine require that this court's physical solution be considered a base line against
which any future diversion or appropriation is to be measured. Cumulative impact
inconsistent with the physical solution may
compel a cessation of EBMUD's diversion.
(Statement of Decision at 2-3).

Although the decision itself binds only
EBMUD, it is clear that any ultimate solution of the problem will need to address
cumulative demands on the river. Such a
solution is possible. For example, certain
instream flows could be mandated for the
lower American River (such as apply to
EBMUD) as a prerequisite to additional upstream diversions. This solution alone,
however, may not adequately address the
entire question at issue.
Other concerns are raised by the physical solution. For example, paragraph 3 of
the physical solution reserves 60,000 acrefeet for future fishery releases. The physical solution is not clear about the source
of water. Sacramento County has asserted
that the water, when required, must come
from EBMUD's entitlement of 150,000 afa.
This appears to be the only logical reading
of the provision, because the court can only
control the actions of EBMUD. It cannot
order the USBR, which is not a party, to
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water.
How the provision would, in fact, take effect is also not clear. EBMUD could be required to hold 60,000 acre-feet in storage
from October to June or it could be precluded from diverting water unless the
USBR maintains the 60,000 acre-feet in reserve.
Ambiguity over the operation of paragraph 3 may have been intended by the
court. A number of provisions within the
physical solution appear to read as if the
reserve or release even one drop ot

court were establishing mstream criteria
that must be met regardless of whether ED-

MUD actually chooses to divert water from
the river. In this regard, it appears clear
that Judge Hodge intended his opinion and
the flow criteria established within the
physical solution to be applied as broadly
as possible. It also appears that his opinion,
although binding only EBMUD, was intended to set a precedent in determinating
whether, or to what extent, additional diversions would be allowed. •

POSSIBLE LONG-TERM SOLUTIONS
Adequately protecting instream values
on the lower American River requires relatively high flow rates. Establishing flows
at lower rates, without knowing more about
the long-term impact of low flows on instream values, runs the risk of destroying
those values. High flow requirements reduce the amount of time that water will be
available for upstream diversions.
Establishing low flows for interim periods with the ability to increase flows if
there are adverse impacts to the instream
resource, even if acceptable instream protections are provided, creates great uncertainty for upstream diversions. It may be
impossible to justify the cost of an upstream diversion facility without knowing
the amount of water that will be available
for diversion.
The only real certainty that can be injected into the process is mandating or encouraging entities to locate diversion points
as far downstream as possible. This would
require analysis of all of the existing and
potential cumulative demands on the lower American River (Table 1). A determination would then have to be made as to
which diverters could not reasonably and
feasibly divert water downstream, as would
be the case with most Placer County and
El Dorado County demands and some demands within the eastern portions of Sacramento County. Water for these areas
would be allowed to be diverted upstream.
All other diversions would need to be located downstream. Although these downstream diversions would not ensure adequate flows within the lower American
IS. L. Somach

River for instream protection, they could
not, of themselves, contribute to instream
injury within the lower American River.
In order to facilitate downstream diversions, legitimate concerns with respect to
water quality would need to be addressed.
A major element of this program would be
watershed protection within the greater
Sacramento River Basin. This could be accomplished through strict control of both
point and nonpoint sources of pollution.
Although this appears to be a major undertaking, existing law requires such protection. When this legal mandate is coupled with the fact that more than one-half
of the population of California depends on
surface water that either originates or is
blended with Sacramento River water, the
goal of watershed protection neither is nor
should be dismissed as unrealistic.
The physical solution established by
Judge Hodge has acted as a catalyst for a
great deal of activity on the lower American River. The court's Special Master, in
conjunction with the liaison group established by the physical solution, has had
many meetings to design a workplan for
the development and implementation of
studies targeting instream flow needs on
the lower American River. This group is
also considering options to reduce the diversion pressure on the lower American
River.
The SWRCB, on its own initiative, and
also in response to the Hodge decision, has
called all potentially affected parties together in informal meetings and intends
to initiate hearings to establish new gen261

era! flow requirements for the lower American River. As part of these hearings, the
SWRCB also intends to look at the question
of appropriate points of diversion. Currently, there appears to be substantial cooperation between the Special Master, liaison groups, and the SWRCB.
EBMUD has initiated extensive environmental review of its water supply options,
pursuant to the California Environmental
Quality Act, including a review of all reasonable, feasible diversion and storage options for its American River water supply.
This review has the potential of causing
EBMUD to abandon its Folsom-South Canal point of diversion in favor of downstream diversion options that may not carry the severe limitations or diversions that
exist within the physical solution.
Sacramento County, potentially a very
large diverter of American River water, is
in the process of developing a water use
program that would (1) consolidate and
better utilize existing surface water entitlements within Sacramento County, (2)
implement conservation measures that
would reduce the quantity of surface water
needed within the county, (3) identify areas that can reasonably and feasibly be
served from points of diversion at or near
the mouth of the American Rilier, and (4)
develop a conjunctive surface and groundwater program that would allow Sacramento County to reduce or eliminate surface water diversions during dry and
critically dry years.
The county's action has, in addition to
the positive activities noted above, also
created some counterproductive actions by
potential upstream diverters. San Joaquin
County, asserting that it is not bound by
Judge Hodge's decision, has filed water
rights applications for up to 322,000 afa

from points of diversion on the American
River upstream from the protected lower
river. These applications have been filed
in spite of the potential impact that they
might have on the instream values of the
river and the fact that the county has reasonable, feasible diversion options from the
Sacramento River.
In addition to these actions, the intention of the USBR is unclear at this time.
Although the USSR has cooperated with
the Special Master and the SWRCB, it has
not taken a particularly active role in the
process. This is somewhat surprising given
the fact that it is the USBR that controls
the flows on the lower American River.
These last points are of great significance. As noted above, the court's decision
binds only EBMUD. As a matter of law, it
does not bind nonparties to the litigation,
including the SWRCB and the USSR. However, the court did look at the broader issues that exist on the river, and Judge
Hodge stated that, in his view, the flow
regime imposed on EBMUD was a "constitutionally-mandated prerequisite to diversion." Although any single future upstream diversion by entities other than
EBMUD will need to be evaluated based
upon reasonable and feasible diversion alternatives, the court has established an extremely strong precedent that cannot be
ignored. Indeed, it may be that the precedent established by the decision is so
strong that as a practical matter it will in
effect bind others not parties to the litigation. That may at least in part be the
driving motivation behind the court's establishment of a strong, active Special Master. There is simply no way that the court's
decision will be allowed to sit dormant or
be ignored by those who have or would
like to have a presence on the river.

CONCLUSION
The conflict between water supply needs volved use what was learned through that
and instream protection has been ad- litigation to assist in solving the remaining
dressed on the lower American River. A problems. There is a very real potential,
physical solution has resolved immediate however, that the time and effort invested
concerns while acting as a powerful aid in in the litigation will be wasted if parties
addressing broader, long-term problems. ignore the history of the conflict with ESThe time-consuming and costly litigation MUD and attempt to proceed without rethat spawned the current activities will gard to instream concerns. In most rehave been worthwhile if the parties in- spects, the litigation may ultimately be

ri
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viewed as the easy part of the effort to
preserve instream values. The cooperative
effort to achieve a long-term balance that
protects instream values and also addresses
adequate consumptive needs will be both
challenging and rewarding. One can hope

that the court's decision and analysis will
serve as a constant reminder that when
balance cannot be achieved, the only or
left is harm to one of the competing
demands.
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